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ABSTRACT
Recent studies reveal that the routing structures of operational net-
works are much more complex than a simple BGP/IGP hierarchy,
highlighted by the presence of many distinct instances of routing
protocols. However, the glue (how routing protocol instances inter-
act and exchange routes among themselves) is still little understood
or studied. For example, although Route Redistribution (RR), the
implementation of the glue in router software, has been used in
the Internet for more than a decade, it was only recently shown
that RR is extremely vulnerable to anomalies similar to the perma-
nent route oscillations in BGP. This paper takes an important step
toward understanding how RR is used and how fundamental the
role RR plays in practice. We developed a complete model and
associated tools for characterizing interconnections between rout-
ing instances based on analysis of router configuration data. We
analyzed and characterized the RR usage in more than 1600 opera-
tional networks. The findings are: (i) RR is indeed widely used; (ii)
operators use RR to achieve important design objectives not realiz-
able with existing routing protocols alone; (iii) RR configurations
can be very diverse and complex. These empirical discoveries not
only confirm that the RR glue constitutes a critical component of
the current Internet routing architecture, but also emphasize the ur-
gent need for more research to improve its safety and flexibility to
support important design objectives.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.3 [Computer-
Communication Networks]: Network Operations—network man-
agement
General Terms: Design, Management, Measurement
Keywords: Routing glue logic, route redistribution, route selection
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent studies reveal that the IP routing design of operational
networks, particularly that of large enterprise networks, is far more
complex than previously understood by the networking community
[17], [15]. Not only many distinct instances of IGP and BGP pro-
tocols are frequently configured in the same network at the same
time, but these routing protocol instances or routing domains also
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Figure 1: An example enterprise network.
are often linked together not by BGP. Instead, routes are exchanged
between different routing domains via route redistribution options
configured on individual border routers connecting these domains.
Figure 1 illustrates such a design. The network consists of three
routing domains, each of which runs a different routing protocol:
OSPF, EIGRP or RIP. This topology may result from a merger of
companies or may derive from administrative reasons. The routing
domains are physically connected by border routers B, C, and E.
For example, B instantiates both an OSPF routing process and an
EIGRP routing process to exchange routing information with other
routers of the respective domains. By default, processes of dif-
ferent routing protocols do not exchange routing information and
consequently the internal routers in the OSPF domain (e.g., router
A) have no visibility of the destinations inside the EIGRP domain
(e.g., router D). Route redistribution provides a simple solution to
this reachability problem by allowing routes to be imported from
one routing process (e.g., EIGRP process on router B) into another
process on the same router (e.g., OSPF process on router B). For
this simple network, full reachability can be achieved by just setting
up mutual route redistribution on both B and E. In such a setting,
route selection, the procedure that a router uses to rank routes from
different routing protocols and select one of them to put into the
forwarding table, plays an equally important role in the integration
of routing protocols. For example because of the route redistri-
bution configurations on routers B and E, router C receives two
routes to router D: one from OSPF and the other from RIP. Route
selection provides the operator of this network a mean to customize
the preference order between the paths C-B-D and C-F -E-D.
Clearly for the example network above, the per router route se-
lection and redistribution procedures provide the required “glue”
logic between the three routing domains and as such constitute a
building block of the IP routing design that is separate from the
routing protocols used.
In the rest of the paper, we will refer to the combination of route
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selection and route redistribution procedures simply as the glue
logic. In some scenarios, BGP can be used as an alternative so-
lution to the glue logic. For example, in the network shown in
Figure 1, one can use BGP as the route selection and redistribu-
tion mechanisms between the three routing domains. However, the
functionalities of the glue logic can not be solely supported by BGP.
For example, the route selection and redistribution mechanisms are
still needed when exchanging routing information between OSPF
and BGP. Thus, the glue logic was introduced as a software en-
hancement by router vendors (rather than a standard protocol).
Furthermore, the glue logic is independently configured per router
and its safety properties have not been under much scrutiny by
the research community. Vendors try to mitigate this problem by
publishing templates for configuring the glue logic and pointing
out common pitfalls of route redistribution configurations through
simple examples [10], [9]. Misconfigurations of route redistribu-
tion (e.g., injecting routes from BGP into OSPF and then back into
BGP) can easily result in persistent forwarding loops between mul-
tiple domains. Such misconfigurations have long been suspected
by the operational community as one of the more likely root causes
of the long-lived loops observed in [19] and IP prefix hijacks [18].
In fact, one recent study [15] has established that the glue logic
introduces a wider range of safety challenges than BGP.
Given the documented safety concerns, one would expect opera-
tors to increasingly choose BGP1 or a similar protocol over the glue
logic for joining routing domains. However, according to our inter-
actions with the operators as well as messages posted on relevant
bulletin boards, the use of the glue logic seems still very preva-
lent. A simple explanation for this phenomenon might be that the
glue logic is relatively easier to configure and to deploy than BGP
since this latter requires the configuration of iBGP/eBGP sessions
and the running of BGP processes at every router. Instead, the glue
logic only necessitates configurations at the border routers. There
is, however, another much more interesting hypothesis to consider:
the glue logic may offer important features to the operators which
are not possible with current routing protocols alone. Put it more
directly: the glue logic could be a fundamental building block of
the Internet routing architecture. We believe it is essential to evalu-
ate this hypothesis and get it right. If the glue logic is fundamental,
then the research community should confirm it as soon as possible
and begin to address its safety problems with the same intensity as
we did for BGP.
A recent paper has presented simple scenarios to show that the
glue logic indeed can be used to meet critical operational require-
ments such as domain backup [14]. In this paper, we take a first
step toward a definite answer regarding whether the glue logic is a
fundamental building block of IP routing design, based on empir-
ical data. Specifically, we study the use of route redistribution in
about 1600 operational networks to test the following hypotheses:
1. Route redistribution is used widely in operational networks.
2. Route redistribution is not used simply to interconnect routing
protocols, but also as a powerful tool for achieving important
design objectives which cannot be achieved with routing proto-
cols (including BGP) alone.
3. Because of the high vulnerability of route redistribution to rout-
ing instabilities and the lack of standard solution to ensure its
safety, the route redistribution configurations in the wild are ad-
hoc and complex.
1BGP is known to have its own safety issues. However, BGP is
better understood and has less concerns than the glue logic.
We extended the method proposed in [17] so that we were able
to precisely identify routing instances and their interconnections
from a network’s router configuration files. In particular, we made
the following major contributions in this paper: (1) We developed
a complete model and associated tools for characterizing intercon-
nections between routing instances based on analysis of router con-
figuration data. (2) We analyzed and characterized router configu-
rations of over 1600 operational networks ranging from large tier-1
ISP networks, enterprise networks, to campus networks. (3) We
demonstrated that the route redistribution is indeed a critical build-
ing block of the current Internet routing architecture by confirm-
ing the above three hypotheses through empirical analysis. (4) We
found that route redistribution is often used by operators to achieve
efficient routing and partition healing. (5) We argued that the lim-
itation of existing vendors’ support leads to increased complexity
in network configurations and potential instability concerns. Thus,
there is an urgent need for a standard solution to ensure safety of
route redistribution. (6) We discussed the potential role of the glue
logic as the Internet architecture evolves to its next generation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
an overview of the route selection and redistribution processes in
the current Internet routing architecture. We present our character-
ization methodologies of route selection and redistribution in Sec-
tion 3. Section 4 describes the operational networks’ configurations
we analyzed in this paper. Section 5 presents our findings regard-
ing the prevalence of route redistribution. Section 6 describes the
patterns our method unearthed and the rationales behind them. Sec-
tion 7 looks at the complexity of the route redistribution configura-
tions. Section 8 interprets the results and discusses the limitations
of the study. Section 9 summarizes related works. Finally, Sec-
tion 10 concludes our study.
2. BACKGROUND ON ROUTE SELECTION
AND REDISTRIBUTION
This section presents important properties of route selection and
route redistribution. First, we introduce some terminologies. A
router may be running multiple routing protocols. For example,
router B from Figure 1 is running both OSPF and EIGRP. In fact,
some vendors even allow routers to run multiple processes of the
same routing protocol (e.g., OSPF routing process 100, OSPF rout-
ing process 200, etc.) We refer to each of these processes as a
routing process.
The routing processes at a router are by default independent:
they do not exchange routing information among themselves. For
example, the OSPF routing process at router B in Figure 1 has its
own set of routes, and so does the EIGRP routing process.
Two routing processes, belonging to different routers but run-
ning the same routing protocol and exchanging routing information
through it, are said to pertain to the same routing instance. In the
rest of the paper, we assign a unique identifier to each routing in-
stance (e.g., 1, 2, ...). Each of the domains 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 1 is a
routing instance. We use <router>.<routing instance> to denote
the routing process belonging to <routing instance> at <router>.
For example, in Figure 1,B.1 represents the OSPF process at router
B. As such, B.1, A.1 and C.1 belong to the same routing instance
(1: OSPF), and B.2, D.2 and E.2 belong to a different routing
instance (2: EIGRP 20).
As explained in the previous section, route selection allows oper-
ators to rank the routes received from multiple routing processes at
a router, and to select the most preferred one: in fact, each routing
protocol is assigned a default administrative distance (AD) value.
This parameter is an integer number. A route received from a rout-
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ing process inherits the AD value of that routing process and the
route with the lowest AD value is preferred. The AD value can be
overridden per routing process and per prefix. The route with the
lowest AD value is installed in the router’s forwarding table and
used to forward the traffic. It is often called the active route.
Then, route redistribution allows operators to redistribute a route
from a source routing process to a target routing process on the
same router. It is important to note that a route is advertised in the
target routing process only if the route is active (i.e., the route is the
one used to forward the traffic) [15].
3. METHODOLOGY
We have followed the general white-box reverse engineering ap-
proach first used in [17] to analyze the configuration data and eval-
uate the three hypotheses. We collect RR usage statistics by simply
tallying the RR commands in the configuration files. The iden-
tification of design patterns and the examination of configuration
complexity are much more involved, requiring the construction of
a graph model of the routing instances for each network, and the
extraction of the route redistributions between the routing instances
as well as the associated policies. Because the recognition of de-
sign patterns is achieved through a manual inspection of the de-
rived graphs, we focus on a few large networks for this specific
task. Finally, we verify the identified design patterns and our un-
derstanding of the rationales behind the patterns with the operators
whenever possible.
[17] also presented three graph models of routing processes and
routing instances and a methodology for distilling them from a net-
work’s configuration files. However, those models do not have suf-
ficient details for our purpose. They do not model the critical AD
parameter. They do not model how routing instances are intercon-
nected (e.g., through one or multiple interconnection points). They
do not model the directions of the route propagations. We address
these limitations by extending the routing instance graph model to
include the details of all the border routers, their routing processes,
and the route redistribution options defined between the routing
processes. The algorithm used by [17] for determining the rout-
ing instances’ boundaries also has some limitations as discussed in
details in the sub-section below.
In the following, we first describe the way we identify and extract
the routing instances of a network from its routers’ configurations.
Then, Section 3.2 focuses on how we determine and represent the
interconnections between the routing instances. Finally, Section
3.3 discusses the impact of incomplete network configurations.
3.1 Determination of routing instances
Our goal is to identify the routing instances present in a network
from its routers’ configuration files. We formerly defined a routing
instance as a collection of routing processes, each residing on a
distinct router, that run the same routing protocol and exchange
routing information through the protocol.
While verifying whether two routing processes run the same rout-
ing protocol is easy, determining whether they exchange routing
information can be intricate. Subtle parameters can have profound
impacts on whether two routing processes are able to exchange
routing information. The methods used by [17] for determining
the boundaries of routing instances do not consider them. The fol-
lowing describes such parameters and scenarios illustrating the dif-
ficulties:
• For each routing process (e.g., RIP, OSPF process 20, EIGRP
30, etc.), a router interface can be either active or passive. This
status modifies the behavior of the router. A RIP routing pro-
cess on an interface that is passive still receives and processes
the advertisements from RIP processes on other routers but does
not send any announcement out. The difficulty to determine
whether two routers exchange routing information is exacer-
bated by the fact that these commands can actually have dif-
ferent consequences for each routing protocol. In OSPF, the
passive status prevents the formation of an adjacency and there-
fore stops any communication – both incoming and outgoing –
between two routing processes running OSPF.
• Two routers connected to the same subnet and running OSPF
with area-id 0 may surprisingly not establish any adjacency. This,
for example, occurs when the OSPF Hello Time Interval, Dead
Time Interval, Stub Area Flags, or authentication parameters
differ on the two interfaces [8].
To accommodate special requirements, operators may intention-
ally take advantage of these parameters. For example, we found
that operators sometimes ran multiple instances of OSPF on a same
subnet, by applying different authentication methods. Therefore,
identifying and taking into consideration these parameters are nec-
essary to accurately determine the routing instances present in the
network.
The networks we analyzed rely on four routing protocols: BGP,
EIGRP, OSPF and RIP. For EIGRP, OSPF and RIP, the procedure
to identify the boundaries of the routing instances consists of three
steps.
1. First, we parse the configuration files to identify the interfaces.
For each interface, relevant attributes including the interface
name, IP address, subnet, OSPF Hello Time interval, OSPF
Dead Time interval and OSPF authentication method are ex-
tracted. The interfaces are stored in a database.
2. Then, the routing process(es) running on each interface, the as-
sociated status (passive or active), and relevant parameters (e.g.,
process id, OSPF stub area flags, OSPF area id) are identified.
An interface running n routing processes has n unique (inter-
face, protocol, routing process id) tuples.
3. Finally, for each (interface, protocol, routing process id) tuple
that is not yet assigned to a routing instance, we use a breadth-
first search (BFS) algorithm to explore all the neighboring in-
terfaces. For each neighboring interface, we determine whether
routing information is exchanged. As explained previously, this
decision relies on multiple criteria and depends on the routing
protocol. If the routing process is OSPF, considered parame-
ters include the router name, IP address, subnet, OSPF process
id, OSPF status, OSPF Hello Time interval, OSPF Dead Time
interval, OSPF Stub Area Flags, OSPF authentication method,
and OSPF area id. If the two interfaces are determined to ex-
change routing information, the neighboring interface is assigned
to the same routing instance and its neighbors are in turn ex-
plored. We proceed until we have analyzed all neighboring in-
terfaces and we repeat the procedure until each (interface, pro-
tocol, routing process id) tuple is assigned to a routing instance.
We process BGP in a separate step because this protocol differs
from the other protocols. This is because a BGP routing process
is not associated with any specific interface. Instead, BGP signal-
ing messages to different neighbors can be sent out via different
interfaces depending on the BGP session configuration and the sta-
tus of the network. To determine the BGP routing instances, we
parse each router configuration file to identify whether it is running
a process of BGP. As such, if a router R is running a routing pro-
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Figure 2: Example enterprise network. Solid lines represent
links connecting the routers. Labels above the lines indicate
the routing protocols running on the links.
dynamic, dynamic, dynamic, dynamic, BGP, AS number) for the
(router name, interface name, IP address, subnet, protocol, routing
process id) attributes. Finally, we group all BGP routing processes
with the same AS number into a single routing instance.
Given a network, we consider all the static and connected routes
across the routers to form a distinct routing instance. This routing
instance can be redistributed into any routing protocol.
To illustrate our method, we consider the example network de-
picted in Figure 2. Figure 3 highlights the boundaries of the rout-
ing instances for this network, in which the underlying router level
topology is depicted in shade. Router A and router Q have different
AS numbers thus there are two BGP instances in the figure. Also,
to avoid clutter in the figure, the routing instance comprising the
static and connected routes is not represented. Figure 4 shows the
routing instances without the routers, and also depicts the intercon-
nections between the routing instances. These edges are further
described in the next section. This example network has multiple
routing instances. Each instance is assigned a globally unique iden-
tifier and the default administrative distance is indicated in brack-
ets. Instances 1 and 2 have default AD values of (20/200). This is
because BGP differentiates external routes (AD=20) from internal
routes (AD=200). Similarly, instance 6 has a default AD value of
(5/90/170) because EIGRP distinguishes 3 types of routes: sum-
mary (AD=5), internal (AD=90) and external (AD=170) routes.
3.2 Identification of routing instance intercon-
nections
We propose the following method to study the interconnections
(or route propagation paths) between the routing instances. When
a route redistribution is configured between two routing processes
(i.e., across the boundaries of two routing instances), we represent
it by a directed edge from the source routing instance into the tar-
get routing instance. The edges are labeled to indicate the router
that is configured to perform the redistribution. When the default
AD of a routing process is overridden at a router, we add the cus-
tomized AD value of the routing process(es) to the edge. A redis-
tribution from u to v by router R, with customized AD values d1
for u and d2 for v is represented by the label “d1,R,d2”. When a
routing process has multiple AD values at a router (e.g., one per
prefix), it is represented by the symbol “+”. For example, in the
graph from Figure 4, the edge from routing instance 3 to routing
instance 5 labelled “105, M” indicates that router M is configured
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Figure 4: Routing instances as well as their interconnections
for the network of Fig. 2. Values in brackets represent the de-
fault AD values of the routing instances. Labels over the edges
represent the routers configured to redistribute routes, and cus-
tomized AD values.
lights that the AD value of the source routing process has been
customized to 105. Finally, since the AD value of the target rout-
ing process is not indicated, one can derive that router M uses the
default AD value (i.e., 110) for M.5.
We call the resulting graph using our above proposed method
a routing instance interconnection graph. Figure 4 shows such a
graph for the network of Figure 2. The routing instance intercon-
nection graph enables us to highlight several important characteris-
tics of the network.
• Routers M and N have a customized AD value (105) for in-
stance 3. This indicates that routing instance 5 prefers to for-
ward traffic to routing instance 3 instead of routing instance 4
when both offer a route to the same destination.
• Router V is only redistributing routes from routing instance 4
into routing instance 7. Thus, the routing information exchange
is only one-way, from instance 4 to 7. One may infer that routing
instance 7 is hosting a monitoring entity which is only interested
in receiving updates.
• Finally, routing instances 5 and 6 have two redistribution points
that are performing mutual route redistribution. Such configu-
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Figure 5: CDF of networks in number of routers.
ures: in the event of a router or link failure, another router is
still present to connect the two routing instances. However, such
configuration can result in routing anomalies [10]. A closer look
at the policies is needed to verify whether adequate means are
implemented to prevent instabilities. Similarly, the graph high-
lights that routes are redistributed between BGP and IGPs at
two interconnection points (B, S) potentially resulting in rout-
ing anomalies.
While a network may comprise a large number of routers, the
routing instance interconnection graph exposes the most important
routers to look at when analyzing the interactions between routing
instances. The graph is particularly valuable for large networks. As
will be shown later, some of the operational networks in our dataset
consist of hundreds or even thousands of routers.
3.3 Impact of incomplete configurations
As will be shown in Section 4, for a fraction of the networks
we do not have all the configuration files. In such networks, our
methodology can overestimate the number of routing instances. To
illustrate this point, we focus on routers N , W , Y , Z, X and L
in Figure 3. These six routers belong to the same EIGRP routing
instance. Now, we assume that the configuration file for router W
is missing. In this case, router N would appear to be disconnected
from the other routers2 and therefore N seems to belong to a dif-
ferent EIGRP routing instance than routers Y , Z, X and L.
4. DATASET
The data we analyzed consists of the router configuration files
from more than 1600 networks. All the corresponding routers are
Cisco routers and the networks are from three different types: en-
terprise, university campus and tier-1 service provider.
Figure 5 depicts the size distribution of the networks. 52% of
the networks have three or fewer routers. This can in part be ex-
plained by the fact that a portion of the data is obtained from a
tier-1 ISP that manages enterprise networks as part of its offered
services. As such, a fraction of the networks does not present the
complete configurations from all the routers but instead consists of
only the configurations from the routers located at customer sites
but managed by the ISP. Despite being incomplete, these configu-
rations were still valuable given the focus of this study: we were
able to use them to analyze the interconnections between the cus-
tomer networks and their provider ISP.
Figure 6 describes the size distribution of the configuration files.
The average configuration file size is 675 lines. The graph shows
2Note that the link N -L does not help here because it is in a differ-
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Figure 7: CDF of networks in number of routing instances.
that 99% of the configurations have in fact fewer than 1500 lines.
Yet, a small number of routers present significantly larger configu-
rations, each of which contains more than 9000 command lines.
5. PREVALENCE OF ROUTE REDISTRI-
BUTION
We first apply the previously described algorithm to identify the
routing instances in each network. Then, we look at the redistri-
butions between these routing instances. Noting that route selec-
tion and route redistribution are widely used, we more closely look
at the redistributions to understand whether routes are exchanged
from an IGP into BGP, from BGP into an IGP or directly between
IGPs. This high level classification provides some ideas on how op-
erators use route selection and route redistribution. The subsequent
section will further delve into this question.
Figure 7 represents the distribution of the networks in terms of
routing instances. Every network has a routing instance corre-
sponding to the connected and static routes. In addition, networks
typically run one or multiple routing protocol instances (e.g., EIGRP,
BGP, OSPF, RIP). We observe that 46% of the networks have only
two routing instances (one of them being the routing instance cor-
responding to the connected and static routes.) These networks
mainly consist of customers where only the configurations from the
customer-premise equipments (CE routers) were available. These
routers are running an instance of BGP to advertise the customer’s
routes into the provider network. The customer site might be a
small one which has one router, or it might running its own IGP
and pointing to the border router for the default route. Unfortu-
nately, we do not have access to the remaining configuration files,
if any. On the other hand, we note that about 10% of the networks
have 10 or more routing instances, and some networks can even






















































































































































































































Figure 8: Percentage of networks (by size) redistributing from
BGP into an IGP, and from IGP into another IGP.
respond to VPN customers with large numbers of sites. Interest-
ingly, as further explained in the next paragraphs, each VPN site
may be composed of, not a single routing instance but, multiple of
them (e.g., OSPF, EIGRP) further explaining the large number of
routing instances for these networks.
When we look at the interconnections between the routing in-
stances, we find that route redistribution is widely used:
1. All networks that deploy the BGP protocol rely on route redis-
tribution to specify what routes (e.g., connected routes, static
routes, IGP routes) to advertise at the BGP level. Each vendor
has its own syntax to configure route redistribution. In Cisco
IOS, there are two commands: the redistribute command is
more general as this same command can be used to redistribute
routes not only into BGP but also into any IGP. Alternatively,
operators can make use of the BGP network command. This
command is specific to BGP. It can only be used to define the
routes to inject into BGP. Both commands require the route to
be present in the router’s FIB for a route to be announced. As
such, route redistribution is a critical component of the routing
architecture.
2. Another common utilization of route redistribution is to inject
the BGP routes into an IGP. Figure 8 represents the frequency
of redistributions from BGP into IGP in the analyzed networks.
We break the dataset into 4 groups, each with approximately the
same number of networks. For each group, we look at the per-
centage of the networks that redistribute routes from BGP into
an IGP, and between IGPs. We note that as networks get larger
(in terms of number of routers), the proportions that redistribute
from BGP into an IGP, and between IGPs increase.
As mentioned above, some networks run a single routing pro-
tocol instance, BGP, to advertise the customer’s routes into the
provider network. Therefore, these routers do not redistribute
from BGP into IGPs. Larger networks more frequently redis-
tribute routes from BGP into IGP. The common alternative to
disseminate BGP routes in a network is to deploy an iBGP net-
work. The iBGP network is generally considered to be more
scalable especially considering the large number of BGP en-
tries. The reliance on route redistribution in larger networks
may come from the fact that many of the networks are enter-
prises which do not provide transit services and compared to an
iBGP network, route redistribution only requires configuration
at the border routers. In fact, a significant number of networks
also deploy MPLS VPNs [20] and some of these networks rely
on redistributions from BGP into IGPs. To illustrate the use
Path 1 (cost 40)
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Figure 9: Illustration of the efficient routing design objective.
of redistribution, we assume an enterprise network with multi-
ple office branches (1, 2, ..., n) interconnected through a BGP
backbone run by a VPN service provider. For office branch 2
to receive the routes from office branch 1, the routes from of-
fice branch 1 must first be redistributed into BGP, propagated
through the BGP backbone. Then these routes can be redis-
tributed from BGP into office branch 2’s IGP. This is an im-
portant approach to interconnect different branches of the same
enterprise customer3. As such, route redistribution is a funda-
mental component not only for BGP (to interconnect the IGP
and BGP) but also for VPN solutions.
3. The last observed usage of route redistribution may be the least
expected. While one may anticipate networks to rely on BGP
to connect different IGP routing instances, we found that op-
erators also rely on route redistribution to directly interconnect
IGP routing instances. Figure 8 represents the percentage of
networks using route redistribution to exchange routing infor-
mation between IGPs. Such practice is more common in larger
networks. Smaller networks may consist of a single routing
protocol instance and do not need to interconnect IGP domains
within their network. Considering networks with more than 15
routers, 34% of them are composed of multiple IGP domains
and deploy route redistribution to exchange routing information
among them.
6. DESIGN PATTERNS AND RATIONALES
The previous section revealed that surprisingly route redistribu-
tion, instead of BGP, is sometimes used to join multiple IGP do-
mains. We looked more closely at the configurations of some of
those networks to understand the motivations behind the usage. We
were able to identify two common configuration patterns of route
redistribution in such circumstances. Discussions with the opera-
tors led us to conclude that each of the two configuration patterns
has an explicit design objective that cannot be fulfilled by BGP.
This section describes these two design objectives in details. For
each of the two objectives, we first present the characteristics of
the networks and the operational requirements that the operators
need to satisfy. We then explain why BGP cannot meet the targeted
operational requirements. Finally, we discuss how route redistribu-
tion provides the necessary functionality.
6.1 Design objective A: efficient routing
Large networks typically consist of multiple office branches span-
ning several geographical locations. For administrative reasons,
each branch may be managed by a separate team and deploy a dis-
tinct routing instance with its own internal routing protocol. Nonethe-
3In a different approach, an IGP default route is pointed to the CE
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Figure 10: Illustration of the partition healing design objective.
less, it is not uncommon that the operator of such a network still
wants to implement efficient routing, i.e., router level shortest-path
routing from any source to any destination across all branches of
the network.
BGP may appear to be a natural solution to connect the routing
instances: Each office branch could be assigned a private BGP au-
tonomous system (AS) number and the BGP protocol would allow
routing information to be exchanged across them. The reality, how-
ever, is that BGP cannot support efficient routing in this setting.
To illustrate the problem, we describe a network from the dataset.
The network has three branches located respectively in North Amer-
ica, Europe, and Asia as shown in Figure 9. The network in North
America is directly connected to the networks in Europe and Asia,
which are also directly connected to each other.
Suppose the operator has implemented a BGP solution to con-
nect the three branches. Consider traffic from North America to
Asia. There are two AS level paths to select from, one trans-Pacific
and the other trans-Atlantic and transiting through the Europe net-
work. If the operator has simply configured the BGP path selection
policy to be first based on the length of the AS-PATH, the trans-
Pacific path with a single AS hop is always preferred. As a result,
all traffic from North America to Asia will be forwarded using the
trans-Pacific link. This is clearly not always efficient, especially
for those traffic sources located on the East Coast of North Amer-
ica. To make an analogy, a traveler flying from North America to
Bombay, India prefers flying across the Pacific ocean when leaving
from the West coast. However, if departing from the East coast, the
route through Europe is shorter.
The operator may attempt to institute more sophisticated BGP
policies by configuring BGP path attributes such as the Cisco pro-
prietary Weight [6] attribute, and the standardized Local Prefer-
ence (Local-Pref), Multi-Exit Discriminator (MED), and Commu-
nity String attributes. Yet, no such policy is sufficient to ensure
efficient routing at all times. Let us first explain the limitation of
the Weight and Local-Pref attributes. These two attributes are de-
signed to allow the operator to preempt the preference based on
the AS-PATH length. However, they are set when a route is im-
ported and by the domain that imports the route; as such, a path
selection policy based on them cannot always adapt correctly to a
change of path cost within an external domain. To illustrate this
problem, consider the scenario where the operator has assigned a
higher Local-Pref value to trans-Atlantic routes on the East Coast
but a lower Local-Pref value to the same routes on the West Coast.
Let us focus on traffic from an East Coast host “Sender 2” to an
Asia host “Receiver”. Suppose that there are actually three distinct
router-level paths from “Sender 2” to “Receiver”, labeled “Path 1”,
“Path 2”, and “Path 3”, respectively, in Figure 9. Furthermore,
suppose that the paths have end-to-end costs (distances) of 40, 50,
and 60, respectively. The Local-Pref settings indeed enable BGP to
correctly choose “Path 1” over “Path 2” under normal conditions.
However, when “Path 1” becomes unavailable (due to a network
failure), traffic from Sender 2 will be incorrectly diverted to “Path
3” despite “Path 2” having a lower cost of (50 vs. 60).
Additional configuration of the MED and/or Community String
attributes cannot fully address the aforementioned limitation of BGP.
While MED or Community String may be utilized in some cases to
signal the router-level distance of a route to an external domain, the
functionality is not general due to limitations of the iBGP protocol.
(For brevity, a detailed explanation of the limitations is omitted.)
Doing so would also introduce tremendous management complex-
ity across the ASes. Finally, [21] provides further explanations re-
garding the limitations of the current BGP protocol in supporting
efficient routing and proposes some extensions to the BGP protocol
to address these limitations.
In light of the drawbacks with BGP, it is no surprise that the op-
erators decided to rely on route redistribution to achieve efficient
routing across multiple routing instances. When redistributing a
route from one IGP routing instance (e.g., an OSPF domain) di-
rectly to another instance of IGP, the cost of that route can be pre-
served. A router can then compute the global cost of the routes
to each destination and select the shortest one. It should be noted
that to avoid routing anomalies, the operators also had to carefully
configure route redistributions with some handcrafted approaches,
which will be discussed in Section 7.2.3.
6.2 Design objective B: partition healing
Partition healing designates the ability for a network to provide
reachability even in the event of a network partition [23]. Prior
work also refers to this design objective as domain backup [14]. To
illustrate the concept, consider a network with the “Example rout-
ing design” depicted in Figure 10. We focus on routers X and Y
within routing instance 2. Because of one or multiple network fail-
ures, routing instance 2 may become partitioned into two separate
networks with X in one partition and Y in the other. In such a
situation, while X and Y can no longer directly communicate, a
backup physical path exists for the two partitions to communicate
through routing instance 1. However, if an operator relies on the
BGP protocol to interconnect the two routing instances by assign-
ing a private AS number to each instance, this backup route will not
be discovered. This is because by default, an AS does not consider
a BGP route when its AS number is present in the AS-PATH of
that route. This behavior can be overridden but BGP then becomes
vulnerable to forwarding loops.
In addition to partition healing, operators want the capability to
select the networks through which the recovering paths can tra-
verse. Networks may request partition healing from their provider(s)
but may not want it from their customer(s). Such preference is mo-
























Figure 11: Complexity of the routing policies applied to route
redistribution in networks that deploy the redistribute com-
mand.
source constraints. Using a customer network as a transit network
is likely to cause congestions in the customer network.
Because of the inability of BGP to support partition healing,
operators appear to rely on route redistribution to implement this
functionality. The right part of Figure 10 describes a configuration
pattern that we observed. It provides partition healing to differ-
ent customer sites through a backbone network. For brevity, only
one site (routing instance 2) is depicted. The sites are connected to
the backbone (routing instance 1) through multiple redistribution
points. Each border router redistributes only a single default route
“0.0.0.0/0” from the backbone domain to the customer site. For
the opposite direction, the border router redistributes every route
except the default route.
This configuration allows all sites to be reachable from each
other. Since each site injects its internal routes into the backbone,
the latter has routes to all the sites. When a host in one site sends
data to a destination located in another site, the traffic will first en-
ter the backbone network because of the advertised default route.
The backbone then forwards the traffic to the destination.
To illustrate the support for partition healing, we now assume
that site 1 is partitioned into two parts with routersA andX on one
side, and routers B and Y on the other. Router Y can no longer
directly reach router X. However, having not received a route toX
through the internal routing protocol, router Y forwards its traffic
to B because of the advertised default route. Router B knows how
to reach X thanks to router A which has received a route to router
X and redistributed it into the backbone network. Consequently,
the traffic reaches X through the Y -B-A-X path.
We observed that this pattern is used not only between providers
and customers but also between the sites of enterprises and univer-
sity campuses.
7. COMPLEXITY OF ROUTE REDISTRI-
BUTION
Sections 5 and 6 confirmed the first two hypotheses from Sec-
tion 1: route redistribution is used widely in operational networks;
and route redistribution is also used as a powerful tool for achieving
important design objectives which cannot be achieved with routing
protocols alone. In this section, we evaluate the third hypothesis:
the route redistribution configurations in the wild are ad-hoc and
complex. We had expected the route redistribution configurations
to be complex. First, operators need to add safe guards against the




















Figure 12: Complexity of the routing policies applied to route
redistribution in networks that deploy the redistribute com-
mand between IGP instances.
sub optimal routing) documented recently [9], [15]. Router ven-
dors have tried to mitigate this problem by publishing “remedy”
templates for basic scenarios [9]. Second, operators may need to
add even more options to support design objectives such as those
shown in Section 6. We had also expected the route redistribution
configurations to be diverse because the route redistribution feature
was initially introduced as a software patch and there has been very
little effort to standardize its usage.
7.1 Breaking down the complexity
Most of the route redistribution configurations in the dataset are
indeed complex. To break down the complexity of the configu-
rations, we look at the routing policies that are applied to control
the redistribution of the routes. We focus on the redistribute com-
mand4, and the frequency of the three following methods applied
to this command.
• Tags: A tag can be assigned as an attribute to a route, based on
which redistributed routes can be filtered or have their attributes
(e.g., metric, next-hop, type) modified.
• Prefix-filters: Prefix-filters provide the ability to apply routing
policies to routes announcing a particular destination prefix.
• Customized AD: Administrative distance (AD) defines the pref-
erence of a route. When a router receives multiple routes to
the same prefix from multiple routing processes, it selects the
route with the lowest AD value. The distance can be defined
per-router, per-routing process and per-prefix.
Figure 11 represents the presence of these three methods in all
the routing policies applied to the redistribute command. 44% of
the networks, that make use of the redistribute command, do not
rely on any of these methods for its configuration. We refer to these
route redistributions as “simple RR”. Vendors have released propri-
etary patches to prevent forwarding loops, sub-optimal routing and
route oscillations when redistributing routes from BGP into OSPF
4Policies can also be applied to the BGP network command which
as explained in Section 5 provides another means to import routes
into BGP. We focused on the redistribute command in this paper,
and did not investigate the complexity of routing policies applied
to the BGP network command. As will be shown, the observations
with the redistribute command already highlight the high complex-
ity of the route redistribution configurations.
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and EIGRP [5], [7]. These extensions may be sufficient for these
networks to fulfill their requirements.
However, the majority of the networks – 56% of all networks em-
ploying the redistribute command – make use of tags, customized
distances or prefix-filters to control the dissemination of the routing
information across routing instances. In fact, most of the networks
(88%) that implement routing policies not only use one method
but use a combination of {tags, prefix-filters}, {prefix-filters, cus-
tomized AD }, {tags, customized AD}, or rely on all three methods
simultaneously.
When concentrating on networks that depend on route redistribu-
tion to interconnect IGP domains, the fraction of the networks that
deploy routing policies based on tags, prefix-filters or customized
AD increases to 92% (Figure 12). This large number may stem
from the high vulnerability of route redistribution when routes are
exchanged among IGPs (e.g., from OSPF to EIGRP, etc.) [10].
Vendors’ safety extensions do not apply to redistributions between
IGPs.
7.2 Causes of the complexity
The prevailing use of routing policies may be puzzling since ven-
dors have released a number of proprietary extensions to prevent
the formation of routing anomalies. Discussions with the operators
reveal that the existing extensions are in fact insufficient to achieve
safety in the network studied, and they implemented handcrafted
solutions in order to achieve safety.
7.2.1 Potential instabilities caused by redistribution
We first provide a brief description of the possible routing anoma-
lies and the vendors’ patches. To illustrate the potential instabili-
ties, we assume the topology depicted in Figure 13 whose routing
instance interconnection graph is given in Figure 14. The topol-
ogy is typical of the MPLS VPN architecture [20]. Routers Y , Z,
A, B, C and D form a BGP backbone that connects the different
sites, where A and B are route reflectors. Border routers Y and
Z redistribute routes from Site 1 into the BGP backbone and vice-
versa. Similarly, border routers C andD connect Site 2 to the BGP
backbone, and redistribute routes from the BGP backbone into Site
2 and vice-versa. Assume a prefix P is originated by X in Site
1. The following sequence of events illustrates the formation of a
forwarding loop.
t1 Y and Z learn a route to P from routing instance 1 and redis-
tribute the route into routing instance 3 (BGP 65000).
t2 The routes from Y and Z get propagated into routing instance
3 (BGP 65000). In particular, router C receives the announce-
ments. C learns a route to P (with B as the next-hop) and
redistributes it into routing instance 4.
t3 D receives the OSPF advertisement from C. D may also re-
ceive the iBGP message from B. Because OSPF has a lower
AD value (110) than iBGP (200),D selects the route from rout-
ing process 4, pointing to M as its next-hop and redistributes
the route into routing process 3.
t4 B now has two routes, one learned from A (which chooses one
route from either Y or Z) and one from D. Suppose B’s BGP
best path selection process chooses the route from D. B sends
the route (with BGP next-hop being D) to C. C will still use
B as the IGP next-hop in order to reach the BGP next-hop D.
As a result, packets may loop between B-D-M -C-B. This
is because a route is re-injected back into the routing instance









Figure 13: Network topology to illustrate the potential instabil-
ities.
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Figure 14: Routing instance interconnection graph of the net-
work from Figure 13. (As explained in Section 3, the values in
brackets represent the AD.)
[5], [20] provide a more detailed description of the above prob-
lem and illustrate other undesired consequences including route os-
cillations, and sub-optimal routing that can result from such a con-
figuration.
7.2.2 Limitations of vendors’ solutions
To prevent these instabilities from happening, some vendors have
offered extensions [5], [7] to existing routing protocols. The exten-
sions only apply in the context of VPNs and to routes redistributed
from BGP into OSPF or EIGRP. Some bits in the headers of the
OSPF Link State Advertisements or EIGRP route advertisement
messages are used to indicate when routes are redistributed from
BGP. These bits serve to notify that other border routers should
discard the announcement. In the example above, when C redis-
tributes the route to P from BGP into OSPF at t2, the OSPF Link
State Advertisement originated by C will have the bits set, inform-
ing router D to discard the received route. As such, the extensions
prevent routing anomalies in simple scenarios.
However, more complex topologies can still be vulnerable to
routing instability. In this section, we report actual observations of
real world networks where the limitations were manifested. We dis-
close two scenarios where the vendors’ solutions fall short, one pre-
viously reported in a hypothetical setting [22] and the other never
reported before. Note that the scenarios below are exactly the same
as the ones in Section 7.2.1 unless otherwise specified.
Limitation 1 – Multi-origin routes: Discussions with operators
highlighted that routes may be originated by multiple routing in-
stances. Considering the network from Figure 13, P may not only
be originated by routing instance 1 but also by some router N in
routing instance 45. The route announcement fromN does not have
the bit set in its header since it is not redistributed from the BGP
domain. In such case, the advertisement from N appears valid to
D. D now has two routes, one from routing instance 3, and one
from N in routing instance 4 (the route redistributed by C is dis-
carded due to set bits). It selects the route from N and point to
M as its next-hop. However, because M is not a border router, it
does not look at the bits in the advertisement. Thus it has two IGP
routes: one redistributed from C and one from N . M will choose
the route from C if the link weight of C-M is smaller than link
weight of M -N , and choose C as the next-hop. Such scenario re-
5For example, both sites 1 and 2 announce a default route.
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Figure 15: Limitations of vendors’ fixes when a site is com-
prised of multiple IGP instances.
sults in a forwarding loop between B-D-M -C-B. To the best of
our knowledge, this limitation has not been previously reported in
the literature.
Limitation 2 – Routes redistributed multiple times: [22] describes
this risk. Suppose the scenario is the same as in Section 7.2.1, ex-
cept that Site 2 consists of multiple IGP instances as illustrated in
Figure 15. In such topology, when the route is redistributed from
routing instance 4 into routing instance 5 (e.g., by F ), the bits in
the packet header are cleared and D can therefore select the redis-
tributed route. Then the forwarding loopB-D...F ...C-B is formed.
7.2.3 Handcrafted solutions and their limitations
Because of the vulnerability of route redistribution to routing
anomaly and the inadequacies of vendors extensions, operators have
developed their own solutions. This section describes some of the
methods operators have deployed. It is important to note that these
solutions have been designed mainly based from experience. They
have not been systematically validated and as such, their general ef-
fectiveness for preventing routing instabilities is largely unknown.
Indeed, we show that some of these methods are still vulnerable
to routing anomalies. In addition, the complexity of the configu-
rations increases the chances for configuration errors. We describe
prefix-based filtering solution that attempts to address Limitation 1,
and routing instance trace solution that attempts to address Limita-
tion 2.
Prefix-based filtering
Section 7.2.2 disclosed the potential formation of permanent for-
warding loops for prefixes originating from multiple routing in-
stances (Limitation 1). To prevent such anomaly, operators make
use of filters and restrict the redistributions.
To illustrate the solution, we consider the network from Fig-
ure 13 and we assume that P (e.g., the default route) is originated
in all three routing instances 1, 3 and 4. In such case, prefix-filters
would be deployed at the border routers (Y , Z, C, D) to only au-
thorize the redistribution of routes to P in a unique direction. We
now assume that the redistribution directions are from routing in-
stance 3 into 1, and from 3 into 4. This method is tedious and
error-prone since it requires the identification of the prefixes, the
definition of the prefix-filters and the application of the filters at all
the relevant border routers.
More importantly, while this solution addresses the forwarding
loop problem (Limitation 1), the network is still vulnerable to an-
other routing anomaly: in the event of network failures, route oscil-
lations can occur. Assuming thatN fails, P is no longer originated
in route instance 4 and we may obtain the following sequence of
events:
t1 Both routers C and D learn a route to P from routing instance
3, both redistribute their routes into routing instance 4 at the
same time.
t2 RouterC receives the route redistributed by routerD from rout-
ing instance 3 into routing instance 4. At the same time, router
D receives the route redistributed by router C from routing in-
stance 3 into routing instance 4. As such, C (resp., D) has two
routes to P . The first one is received from routing instance 3
and the second one is received from routing instance 4. Because
routing instance 4 has a lower AD, router C (resp., D) updates
its entry to P and points to M as the next-hop. Both C and D
stop redistributing a route to P into routing instance 4.
t3 Router D (resp., C) no longer receives the route from C (resp.,
D). D (resp.,C) only has one route toP which is received from
routing instance 3. Therefore D (resp., C) updates its route to
P , selecting the route from routing instance 3 and redistributes
it into routing instance 4.
We note that the states at t1 and t3 are identical. As such, the
route oscillates between these states. [14] analyzed the origins
of the anomalies in route redistribution and proposed a number
of guidelines. To prevent these oscillations, the prefix-filters must
be accompanied by an adjustment of the AD values at the border
routers, such that 3 has a lower AD value than 1 and 4. With these
modifications, when routers C and D receive two routes at time
t2, they will maintain their existing active route through routing in-
stance 3.
Routing instance trace
Section 7.2.2 discussed the possible formation of permanent for-
warding loops for prefixes that are redistributed across multiple IGP
instances (Limitation 2). Networks that implement efficient routing
through route redistribution as described in Section 6 can also re-
sult in transient forwarding loops. Although the cost of an OSPF
route is preserved between OSPF routing instances and routers can
compute the shortest path to every destination, forwarding loops
can emerge. This is because when a route is redistributed into a tar-
get routing instance, this latter does not have a global view of the
network but only knows the next routing instance where to forward
the traffic. As such, the behavior is similar to that of a distance vec-
tor protocol and forwarding loops can form like in RIP (count to
infinity problems) [15]. To avoid permanent and transient forward-
ing loops, some operators have implemented an interesting method
which we call routing instance trace.
BGP addresses forwarding loop problems through the AS-PATH
where each BGP AS prepends its identifier when a route traverses
a domain. This field allows an autonomous system to recognize
routes it previously forwarded. As such, the BGP AS-PATH pre-
vents routes from being re-injected back into an autonomous sys-
tem where it initially came from. The same technique cannot be
directly implemented in other routing protocols because contrary
to BGP, IGP protocols (RIP, OSPF, EIGRP, etc.) typically support
only a single fixed-length 32-bits tag per route.
The routing instance trace approach keeps track of the routing
instances traversed by a route through that 32-bits tag field: each
routing instance is associated with a specific bit in the binary rep-
resentation of the tag. For example, routing instance 1 may be as-
signed the right most bit of the tag. Whenever a route traverses a
routing instance, its corresponding bit is flipped from 0 to 1. This
method implements a trace that keeps track of the routing instances
that have been traversed, similar to the AS-PATH in BGP. Networks
therefore rely on the routing instance trace to prevent loops from
occurring.
The limitations of this method are that it requires a long and
convoluted configuration at each border router, and that it does not
scale to a large number of routing instances due to the limited num-
ber of bits in the available tag.
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8. DISCUSSION
Section 8.1 discusses possible interpretations of the empirical re-
sults. Section 8.2 describes some limitations of this study.
8.1 Interpretation of results
Our data analysis results indicate that the use of route redistri-
bution in operational networks is to a large extent due to the limi-
tations of current routing protocols in meeting some design objec-
tives (e.g., efficient routing and partition healing). A first interpre-
tation of these results could be that existing routing protocols need
to be extended or new routing protocols need to be defined to sup-
port the identified properties. However, this implies that every time
a new operational need were identified, a new extension to the ex-
isting protocols or a new protocol would need to be created, which
could be a very lengthy process. Such an approach would ham-
per innovations and the deployment of new services. This study
shows that operators do not wait for new protocol extensions but
“creatively” use whatever available tools to fulfill their objectives.
As such, a more likely interpretation of the results seems that
routing protocols may always need to be accompanied by some
tools that leave enough flexibility in the architecture. As long as
the Internet routing architecture is composed of multiple routing
protocols, the glue logic is likely to remain and play a fundamental
role. To illustrate this point, we draw an analogy between a set of
routing protocols and a distributed database system. Each routing
protocol can be viewed as one database offering a number of entries
(i.e., routes). A router is a client that can access several databases at
a time. The glue logic is the query interface that allows the client to
compare the entries from different databases and to select the best
entry for this specific client.
Interestingly, this analogy illuminates a potential lack of flexi-
bility of the current version of glue logic. The route selection and
route redistribution procedures only allow operators to rank and se-
lect routes based on the administrative distance (AD) parameter.
This rather simplistic logic might have severely limited the range
of functionality that the glue logic can provide. For example, the
efficient routing design pattern is currently only feasible between
routing instances of the same routing protocol (e.g., between OSPF
1 and OSPF 2). However, an enterprise network may consist of
multiple branches deploying different routing protocols. A branch
in France may deploy RIP and rely on the metric attribute of a route
to carry an indication of the physical distances in kilometers. An-
other branch which is in the U.K. may use the OSPF protocol and
rely on the link cost to reflect the physical distance in miles. The
current glue logic does not permit the operators to achieve efficient
routing between the two branches through the following policy:
“rank RIP routes based on RIP metric and OSPF routes based on
1.6 × OSPF cost.” As another example, it makes good sense from
the traffic engineering perspective that some routes are advertised
widely (e.g., from one AS to another via BGP) only if the available
bandwidth for the corresponding data path exceeds a determined
threshold. However, such a policy cannot be implemented using
the current glue logic.
In fact, as illustrated in Figure 16, we can identify three essen-
tial primitives of the glue logic, those of: 1) ranking of the routes
from multiple routing processes, 2) importing of the routes from
the routing protocols into the forwarding table and 3) exporting of
the routes from the forwarding table into the routing protocols at
each router. The existing primitives rely on the AD parameter. It
would be a worthwhile exercise to consider alternative designs to
add more flexibility to the glue logic. An extreme design point
would be to add both the ability to manipulate based on additional
criteria (e.g., metric, bandwidth, etc.) and the support of basic con-
Goal: select paths along which to send data
Routing architecture
Goal: rank routes, import routes from RIBs to FIB
and export routes from FIB to RIBs
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Figure 16: Main components of the routing architecture.
structs (e.g., if condition, while loop, for loop). A step in this di-
rection is taken in [4].
One may contest that adding flexibility to the glue logic may not
always be desirable since it can be detrimental to routing safety.
We argue that limiting the flexibility of glue logic is not an ef-
fective means to enhance routing safety. Section 7 showed that
the existing glue logic, which is based on a single AD parame-
ter, is already highly vulnerable to routing anomalies. Instead, ef-
forts should be directed toward identifying sufficient conditions and
associated configuration guidelines that are sufficient for ensuring
routing safety and flexible enough to allow operators to achieve
their desired objectives. [14] took a first step in this direction.
We also envision the addition of a separate network-wide coor-
dination mechanism to the glue logic to assure safety (Figure 16).
The coordination mechanism would gather parameters related to
the glue logic from all routers and make sure that collectively the
parameters meet certain sufficient conditions for safety. The goal
of the coordination mechanism is not to disseminate routing infor-
mation, but to coordinate the actions at each router and to ensure
that the workings of the glue logic at the different entities remain
compliant with some global constraints. This functionality can be
achieved by either enhancing the existing routing protocols (e.g.,
adding new attributes in routing updates) or deploying a new (cen-
tralized or distributed) coordination protocol, or some other mech-
anisms.
Finally, there are ongoing efforts to redesign the Internet routing
architecture [1], [24], [3]. We believe that the role of the glue logic
should be closely examined in these studies.
8.2 Limitations of study
The number of design patterns that can be discovered is ulti-
mately constrained by the dataset and the methodology. The con-
sideration of additional networks or other sources of information
and the usage of alternative data mining methods may potentially
reveal more operational design patterns. However, the goal of this
study was not to identify all existing operational requirements, but
to investigate whether the glue logic is used to implement impor-
tant design objectives that cannot be achieved with existing routing
protocols alone.
We did not attempt to characterize the prevalence of the identi-
fied patterns (efficient routing and partition healing) in the dataset.
Neither did we examine in depth the safety of the route redistribu-
tion configurations (e.g., determining the percentage of networks
in the dataset that are vulnerable to routing anomalies). While such
studies would be insightful, we sought to first better understand
why and how operational networks use route redistribution. We
disclosed some vulnerabilities of some configurations to illustrate
the state of the art and the risk with current methods.
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9. RELATED WORK
A number of studies have looked at router configurations but for
different purposes. For example, [11] and [12] parse configura-
tion files to detect potential misconfigurations. This study is the
first to look at the usage of route redistribution in operational net-
works. The closest related work is [17], which inferred routing de-
sign in operational networks from router configuration files. This
study differs from [17] in several aspects. First, [17] concentrates
on identifying the presence of the routing instances in a network,
whereas this study focuses on the interconnections (i.e., the glue
logic) between the routing instances. Second, the methodology in
[17] does not consider a number of parameters that may impact
the boundary of a routing instance and it does not model the AD
value of a routing process, which is a critical parameter in deter-
mining a route’s eligibility to be redistributed. Third, [17] does not
separately model the details of each interconnection point when
two routing instances are interconnected at multiple border routers.
These limitations of [17] restrain its ability to discover and infer the
rationales of design patterns. Finally, in terms of results, while [17]
revealed that the Internet landscape is more complex than a simple
BGP/IGP hierarchy, this study has discovered two detailed routing
design patterns driven by operational requirements that cannot be
fulfilled by routing protocols alone.
In terms of routing anomalies, [10], [9], [15], [14], and [16] illus-
trated possible undesired consequences that can result from route
redistribution. Yet, [10] and [9] only addressed simple scenarios,
and [15] and [14] relied on hypothetical configurations to illustrate
potential instabilities. This paper is the first empirical look at the
problem: we describe actual topologies and requirements to be met
by operators, and we present some of the solutions currently used
by operators.
[21] proposes changes to BGP to support efficient routing. The
proposed modifications allow routers to select more optimal paths
than the current BGP path selection algorithm. Yet, they do not
guarantee the selection of the shortest path. In addition, [21] only
addresses one requirement but not the other design objectives (e.g.,
partition healing) that our study disclosed. Finally, to address the
shortcomings of existing routing protocols, [13] introduces an ele-
gant framework for operators to implement their own routing pro-
tocols. Yet, whether the identified operational requirements can be
supported by such protocols still needs to be investigated.
10. CONCLUSION
By examining operational network configurations, this paper has
brought to light the critical role played by the “hidden” glue logic
between the routing protocols. This study confirmed the prevalence
of route redistribution in operational environments. More impor-
tantly, it showed that operators rely on it not simply to interconnect
routing instances but also to implement design objectives beyond
simple exchange of routes. These discoveries expose some major
insufficiencies of existing routing protocols to support operational
requirements. The study also found that the high vulnerability of
route redistribution to routing anomalies has resulted in complex
configurations. Furthermore, some of the complex configurations
can still be vulnerable to routing instabilities. These empirical re-
sults seem to strongly suggest that making routing protocols safe
and robust alone may not be sufficient to ensure robustness of a net-
work. This observation underscores the urgency for more efforts by
both the research and operational communities to address all docu-
mented safety problems of the glue logic. Finally, we believe that
the evolution of the glue logic role in the Internet architecture con-
situtes an exciting area for future research.
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